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The Constitutionality of High School
Graduation Prayers Under
Harris v. School District No. 241
I.

INTRODUCTION

The propriety of prayer in public life has always been a
difficult issue for the Court. The Founding Fathers separated church and state via Establishment Clause. 1 Ironically,
the same week the Establishment Clause passed, the Founding Fathers voted to begin each of their Congressional sessions with prayer. 2 The exact boundaries of the church-state
divide were left undefined. Today, courts still puzzle over
where to draw these boundaries, especially in the area of
public prayer. As our society has become more cosmopolitan,
the conflict between religion and government has increased
and line drawing has become even more difficult and complex.
High school graduation prayers were supposed unconstitutional after Lee v. Weisman. 3 However, Weisman did not
address all of the issues, and graduation prayers are still
permissible in some circuits. Through its analysis of Harris
v. School District No. 241, this Note, in four parts, considers
some of the unaddressed issues. Part II reviews the history
of school and graduation prayers leading to Weisman. Part
III summarizes the background for Harris. Part IV analyzes
Harris under three tests still valid in a post- Weisman era.
Part V concludes that under certain circumstances graduation prayers are still constitutionally permissible.
II. THE HISTORY OF GRADUATION PRAYERS

A.

The Early Cases

Controversy over high school graduation prayers began
in the early 1970s. 4 From 1972 to 1974 three cases were
1 U.S. CONST. amend I.
2 Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 674 (1984).
3 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992); see, e.g., Griffith v. Teran, 807 F. Supp. 107, 108
(1991) (parties agreeing that a pre-Weisman decision denying a motion to enjoin
school district from holding graduation prayers was rendered invalid by Weisman).
4 These cases were probably inspired by the classroom prayer cases. The
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decided. 5 In each case, the lower courts upheld the practice
of graduation prayers. 6 These early cases provided five arguments which have recurred in later cases. 7 First, it may
be argued that offensive effects of graduation prayer can be
mitigated by making graduation attendance voluntary. 8 One
court buttressed this argument by pointing out that participation in the prayer may be voluntary as well. 9 Implicit in
this argument is that attendance by the student is consent
to the prayer.
Second, it may be argued that the state is subsidizing a
religious activity if the graduation ceremony is paid for by
tax monies. 10 In Wood v. Mt. Lebanon Township School
District, the court dismissed this claim as de minimis, 11
holding that prayers are such a brief part of the ceremony
that no monetary harm results from the time consumed by
invocation and benediction. 12 In Grossberg v. Deusebio, the
court took a different approach in considering the tax monies issue. The court weighed the use of student funds for
the prayer against any state funds used to pay for graduation ceremonies. 13
Third, it may be argued that the length of prayer may
be weighed when determining whether Establishment Clause
infringements have occurred. Along these lines, courts have
Court held classroom prayers unconstitutional. See, e.g., Abington Sch. Dist. v.
Schempp. 374 U.S. 203, 229 (1963) (beginning the public school day by reading,
without comment, from the Bible violated the Establishment Clause); Engel v.
Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (beginning the public school day with prayer violated
the Establishment Clause because prayers were solely religious in nature and they
advance a religious cause through the government); see also Thomas A. Schweitzer,
Lee v. Weisman and the Establishment Clause: Are Invocations and Benedictions at
Public School Graduations Constitutionally Unspeakable?, 69 U. DET. MERCY L.
REV. 113, 124 (1992).
5 Weist v. Mt. Lebanon Sch. Dist., 320 A.2d 362 (1974), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 967 (1974); Grossberg v. Deusebio, 380 F. Supp 285 (E.D. Va. 1974); Wood v.
Mt. Lebanon Township Sch. Dist., 342 F. Supp. 1293 (1972).
6 ld.
7 Grossberg is the most legally developed of these early cases. It addresses
all four of the factual arguments used by the early cases in upholding graduation
prayer.
8 Grossberg, 380 F. Supp. at 287; Wood, 342 F. Supp. at 1294; Weist, 320
A.2d at 364-65 (justifying graduation prayer on the sole grounds that graduation
ceremonies are voluntary).
9 Grossberg, 380 F. Supp. at 290.
10 Wood, 342 F. Supp. at 1295.
11 ld ..
12 ld.
13 Grossberg, 380 F. Supp. at 287.
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reasoned that the prayer would "be brief, transient and
subsumed in the secular degree awarding ceremony." 14
Fourth, it may be argued that some overlap between
religion and government is inevitable and that, for this reason, not every expression of religion in public life violates
the Establishment Clause. 15 Along this line of reasoning, it
has been suggested that courts are incapable of enjoining
every technical infringement of the First Amendment. 16 Absolute separation would be impossible since government and
religion must interactY The government's role is one of
neutrality. 18 It should neither inhibit nor encourage, but
rather should permit personal choices free from state compulsion.19
Fifth, it may be argued that, if the graduating class
through its class representatives decided to have the
graduation prayer, no First Amendment violation occurred.20 Courts have rejected this line of argument as a
"symbolic washing of hands."21 It reasoned that a "graduation ceremony for a public school class, held on public
school grounds, and administered by public school personnel,
at which diplomas are officially awarded by the administration, is a public school event."22 The court, however,
held that any infringements were outweighed by voluntary

14 ld. at 291.
15 ld. at 289.
16 Weist v. Mt. Lebanon Sch. Dist., 320 A.2d 362, 365 (Penn.), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 967 (1974) (quoting Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 312-313 (1952).
(Douglas, J.). Justice Douglas's majority opinion stated that:
Prayers in our legislative halls; the appeals to the Almighty in the messages of the Chief Executive; the proclamations making Thanksgiving Day
a holiday; "so help me God" in our courtroom oaths-these and all other
references to the Almighty that run through our laws, our public rituals,
our ceremonies would be flouting the First Amendment. A fastidious atheist or agnostic could even object to the supplication with which the Court
opens each session: "God save the United States and this Honorable
Court").
17 Grossberg, 380 F. Supp. at 290.
18 ld.
19 ld. (using neutrality reasoning in response to a free exercise argument
raised in addition to an Establishment Clause infringement argument).
20 ld. at 287.
21 ld. at 288.
22 ld. But see Harris v. School Dist. No. 241, 821 F. Supp. 638, 643 (D.
Idaho 1993).
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attendance, the short duration of the prayer, and the overlap of religion into public life. 23
Although these early cases cite to Supreme Court cases,
they do not follow any test created by the Court. This is
ironic since Lenwn v. Kurtzman was decided almost a year
before the first of these cases. 24 Grossberg comes the closest to following the Supreme Court by correctly recognizing
the fact sensitivity of the Establishment Clause and the
need to strike the proper balance. 25 Conversely, the later
cases rely much more heavily on Supreme Court promulgated tests. 26

B. The Later Cases
After the initial surge of cases in the early 1970s, no
cases focused exclusively on high school graduation prayer
until Stein v. Plainwell Community School27 and Graham
v. Central Community School District of Decatur28 were
decided in 1985. 29 Including these two cases, eight gradua23 Grossberg, 380 F. Supp. at 290.
24 Id.
25 ld. at 289 ("The duty of the courts is to strike the proper balance. The
area is a sensitive one, involving questions of degree." (quoting Allen v. Hickel, 424
F.2d 944, 949 (1970)); cf Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2661 (1992).
26 Essentially two tests have been used in later cases: the three-prong Lemon test and the historical tradition test. The most prevalent test is Lemon. Every
graduation prayer case after Grossberg uses this test somewhere in its analysis.
This three-prong test requires that a governmental practice: (1) reflect a clearly
secular purpose; (2) have a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion; and (3) avoids excessive government entanglement with religion. See Lemon
v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971). However, Lemon has been extensively
criticized by scholars, practitioners, and members of the Court. Lamb's Chapel v.
Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2141, 2149 (1993) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in the judgment) ("As to the Court's invocation of the Lemon test: Like
some ghoul in a late-night horror movie that repeatedly sits up in its grave and
shuffles abroad, after being repeatedly killed and buried, Lemon stalks our Establishment Clause jurisprudence once again, frightening the little children and school
attorneys . . . . "); Lee v. Weisman, 112 S.Ct. 2649, 2655 (1992) (United States
Attorney General in an amicus and the petitioner both advocate overturning Lemon); Rex E. Lee, The Religion Clauses: Problems and Prospects, 1986 B.Y.U. L.
REV. 337, 340-42 (1986). While many feel the Lemon test is unworkable, the Court
has not seen fit to overrule it directly. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at 2655.
The second test is the historical-tradition test. See Marsh v. Chambers, 103
S.Ct. 3330, 3333 (1983) (upholding Nebraska's practice of beginning each legislative
session with prayer since the practice is "deeply embedded in the history and tradition of this country"). In Weisman, the Court held this test was not applicable to
graduation invocations and benedictions.
27 610 F. Supp. 43 (W.D. Mich. 1985), rev'd, 822 F.2d 1406 (6th Cir. 1987).
28 608 F. Supp. 531 (S.D. Iowa 1985).
29 From 1974 to 1985, several school prayer cases were decided, but none of

491]

CONSTITUTIONALITY OF SCHOOL PRAYER

495

tion prayer cases were decided between 1985 and 1991. 30
All eight cases used the Lemon test as part of their analysis. But the presence of other tests and the difficulty of
applying the Lemon test led to a different result. This Note
will center on the five cases decided in federal court. 31
These five cases were split almost evenly on whether graduation prayers were constitutional. Jones II and Albright held
graduation prayers did not violate the Establishment Clause,
whereas, Graham and Lundberg held the inverse. Paradoxically, Stein held that the invocations and benedictions violated the Establishment Clause, but then the court defined
under what circumstances such prayers would be acceptable.

these cases exclusively focused on high school graduation prayers. Given the fact
sensitivity of Establishment Clause issues those cases are not discussed in this
Note. See, e.g., Florey v. Sioux Falls Sch. Dist., 619 F.2d 1311 (8th Cir. 1980)
(holding that the school district's policy permitting observance of holidays having
both secular and religious bases did not violate the Establishment Clause under
the Lemon test); Doe v. Aldine Indep. Sch. Dist., 563 F. Supp. 883 (S.D. Tex. 1982)
(holding that the practice of prayers and the singing of the school song, which
referred to deity at high school assemblies and athletic contests failed all three
prongs of the Lemon test).
In Florey, the school district policy was upheld by the court, which included,
inter alia, invocations and benedictions at high school graduation. However, the
court never analyzed these prayers separately. See Florey, 619 F.2d at 1320. The
court's analysis focused on whether or not school Christmas programs violated the
Establishment Clause.
Note that Doe is distinguishable from the graduation prayer issues since the
court focused on the activities that took place during regular school hours. Any
comparison to high school prayer would be overruled by Jones v. Clear Creek
lndep. Sch. Dist, 977 F.2d 963 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2950 (1993).
See also Schweitzer, supra note 4, at 124 n.50.
30 Jones v. Clear Creek lndep. Sch. Dist. 930 F.2d 416 (5th Cir. 1991), cert.
granted, 112 S. Ct. 3020, reh'g denied, 977 F.2d 963 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied,
113 S. Ct. 2950 (1993); Stein v. Plainwell Community Sch., 822 F.2d 1406 (6th Cir.
1987); Albright v. Bd. of Educ. of Granite Sch. Dist., 765 F. Supp. 682, 684 (D.
Utah 1991); Lundberg v. West Monona Community Sch. Dist., 731 F. Supp. 331
(N.D. Iowa 1989); Graham v. Central Community Sch. Dist. of Decatur, 608 F.
Supp. 531 (S.D. Iowa 1985); Sands v. Mooring Unified Sch. Dist., 809 P.2d 809
(Cal. 1991); Bennett v. Livermore Unified Sch. Dist., 238 Cal. Rptr. 819 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1987); Kay v. David Douglas Sch. Dist. No. 40, 719 P.2d 875 (Or. App. 1986).
31 State constitutions can be more restrictive than the U.S. Constitution. For
this reason, it is difficult to compare these cases to federal cases. In states with
constitutions more restrictive than the U.S. Constitution, state jurisprudence is controlling-federal jurisprudence is persuasive only. However, state constitutions cannot be less restrictive than the U.S. Constitution because of the Supremacy Clause.
U.S. CONST. art. VI. But many of the arguments in these state cases track those
made in federal cases. These three state cases invalidated school graduation
prayer. Sands v. Mooring Unified Sch. Dist., 809 P.2d 809 (Cal. 1991); Bennett v.
Livermore Unified Sch. Dist., 238 Cal. Rptr. 819 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987); Kay v. David Douglas Sch. Dist. No. 40, 719 P.2d 875 (Or. App. 1986).

496
1.

BYU JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW

[Volume 8

Stein v. Plainwell Community School

In Stein, two school districts allowed prayer at graduation. One district had prayers given by students while the
other had prayers given by clergy. As in the early cases,
the school district argued that prayer should be upheld
since attendance at graduation was voluntary. The school
district also tried to distinguish classroom prayer from graduation prayer by emphasizing the infrequency of graduation
prayers.
Stein took a novel approach to the issue. 32 Stein upheld the idea of graduation prayer under the "history and
tradition" test in Marsh v. Chambers. 33 However, Stein concerned itself with the contents of prayers, prohibiting prayer
that would be tantamount to saying to "parents and students: we do not recognize your religious beliefs, our beliefs
are superior to yours." 34 Importantly, the court in Stein
went on to find that the content of the prayers in question
were unacceptable under Marsh.
In addition to its content-oriented approach, Stein also
presents a new approach not seen in the early cases.
Separationists argue that graduation prayer indoctrinates
and proselytes students. The court resolves this concern by
reference to parental attendance at graduation, which attendance shields students from religious coercion. 35

32 Before considering its novel approach, the court first goes through all
three prongs of the Lemon test and finds that graduation prayer passes all three
prongs. Stein, 822 F.2d at 1407-08.
33 103 S.Ct. 3330, 3333 (1983) (applying the history and tradition test promulgated in Marsh u. Chambers to the graduation prayer issue for the first time).
34 Stein, 822 F.2d at 1410. Stein's approach to deciding the validity of school
prayer based on content of the prayer has been criticized for two reasons. First,
courts should not focus on whether the prayer contains religious words, but on
whether the prayer itself is constitutionally permissible. ld. at 1411-12 (Wellford,
J., dissenting). Second, prohibiting controversial speech before it is spoken is a
prior restraint. Id.; see also Ken Jorgensen, Making Prior Restraint an Enforcement
Tool of the Establishment Clause: Stein v. Plainwell Community Schools, 1989
B.Y.U. L. REV. 305-17 (1989).
35 Stein, 822 F.2d at 1409.
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Upholding graduation prayer

Jones v. Clear Creek Independent School District36 is
one of the leading cases on school prayer and represents the
current rule in the Fifth Circuit. In Jones II, the traditional
graduation invocations and benedictions were challenged
since they contained overt Christian references. 37 The court
used the Lemon test to analyze the case. The court found
that the secular purpose prong was satisfied, since prayer
can be used to solemnize an event. 38 The court used the
arguments of early cases to pass the primary effects test:
the prayers were brief, students only experienced the prayer
once in four years, and the parents' presence decreased the
impact of coercion by peers or school officials. 39 Finally, no
excessive entanglement was found since students offered the
prayers, not clergy. 40 Having met all three prongs of the
Lemon test, the court held the school's practice of having
prayers at graduation constitutional. 41
Although Albright v. Board of Education of Granite
School District42 also found that graduation prayer satisfied
the Lemon test, one significant facial difference distinguished it from Jones II, Stein, or any of the earlier cases.
School officials did not "control, regulate or preapprove [sic]
the content of speech or expression by any participant."43
Students were counseled to speak in terms that represent
and respect diverse views. 44 Conversely, Jones II required
some sort of monitoring to ensure prayers were non-proselytizing in content. 45
In Albright, the school had no "police power" to ensure
prayers were not proselytizing, since they could not monitor
content. Students were encouraged to be sensitive to others'

36 930 F.2d 416 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. granted, 112 S. Ct. 3020, reh'g denied,
977 F.2d 963 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2950 (1993) [hereinafter
Jones ll].
37 ld.
38 ld. at 422.
39 Id.
40 ld. (noting that the school district did not decide who gave the prayer,
but it did pre-screen prayers for "sectarianism and proselytization").
41 ld.
42 765 F. Supp. 682, 684 (D. Utah 1991).
43 ld.
44 ld.
45 Jones, 977 F.2d at 964 n.l.
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beliefs, and the school officials and district played a completely neutral role. 46

3. Graduation prayer held unconstitutional
In Graham v. Central Community School District of
Decatur47 , the district had Christian ministers give invocations and benedictions at high school graduation for over
twenty years. The school board decided to continue the
practice despite the plaintiffs grievances that the practice
personally offended him.
Eventually, these graduation prayers were held unconstitutional on grounds that they failed the secular purpose
prong and the primary effects prong of Lemon: "the invocation and benediction portions of the defendant's commencement exercises serve a Christian religious purpose, not a
secular purpose."48 This conclusion is "supported not only
by the great weight of the evidence . . . but by the undeniable truth that prayer is inherently religious."49 Invocations
and benedictions were held to have the primary effect of
advancing the Christian religion. 50 In Graham, the court
never reached the excessive entanglement prong because its
rulings on the first two prongs were dispositive. 51

46 The school board policy did not require benedictions or invocations, and
the students had substantial input into the program. Albright, 765 F. Supp. at
684-85 n.4.
47 608 F. Supp. 531, 532-36 (D. Iowa 1985).
48 ld. at 535.
49 ld.; see id. at 535-36 (further quoting Karen B. v. Treen, 653 F.2d 897
(5th Cir. 1981), affd, 455 U.S. 913 (1982), which held that
[p]rayer is perhaps the quintessential religious practice for many of the
world's faiths, and it plays a significant role in the devotional lives of
most religious people . . . . [it) is an address of entreaty, supplication,
praise, or thanksgiving directed to some sacred or divine spirit, being, or
object. . . . [t]hat it may contemplate some wholly secular objective cannot
alter the inherently religious character of the exercise).
50 Graham, 608 F. Supp. at 536. The court never points to which facts in
the case it uses to draw this conclusion. Rather, it draws a legal conclusion by
comparing the case in question to Hall v. Bradshaw, 630 F.2d 1018, 1020-21 (4th
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 965 (1981). Hall, after analyzing printed prayers
on official state maps, held that "a prayer, because it is religious, does advance
religion, and the limited nature of the encroachment does not free the state from
the limitations of the Establishment Clause." Id.
51 Graham, 608 F. Supp. at 536.
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Mter finding that the Lemon test had not been met, the
court in Graham considered other miscellaneous arguments
to buttress its conclusion. First, it rejected the school
board's use of Lynch, since that case "did not involve any
religious exercise like prayer at a public government function."52 The court placed great importance on the distinction between public prayer and Christmas displays. Second,
the court criticized the early cases for placing too much
emphasis on voluntary attendance at graduation. 53 Finally,
when the school board tried to compare its prayers to those
upheld in Marsh, 54 the court distinguished the two cases.
The court considered the Marsh decision as "a singular
Establishment Clause decision that rests on the 'unique
history' of legislative prayer, and the holding of that case is
clearly limited to the legislative setting."55
The facts in Lundberg v. West Monona Community
School District are different from other graduation prayer
cases. 56 The school board voted against including high
school graduation invocations and benedictions. 57 The plaintiff, an ordained minister who was going to give the graduation prayer, sued to force the school district to reverse its
decision. 58 The court held that the practice of permitting
graduation prayers failed two prongs of Lemon for reasons
similar to Graham. 59
Lundberg adds two new arguments to the cumulative
graduation prayer jurisprudence. First, methods other than
prayer can be used to solemnize graduations. 60 This argument implies that the least offensive means should be used
to solemnize graduations. 61 For example, a song or reading
Shakespeare. 62

52 !d.
53 !d. at 536-37.
54 !d. at 535.
55 !d. at 535. The court reasons that Lerrwn is used both before and after
Marsh, which illustrates its post-Marsh viability.
56 731 F. Supp. 331 (N.D. Iowa 1989).
57 !d. at 334-35. The primary motive for the vote was the risk of personal
liability from possible suits brought under the Establishment Clause.
58 !d.
59 !d. at 341-47. The excessive entanglement prong was not analyzed because it was not argued.
60 ld. at 342-43.
61 ld.
62 ld.
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Second, the court presents a test to deal with conflicts
between constitutional rights. A balancing test should be
used "to maximize . . . the overall measure of the fundamental rights created by the framers, by deciding which
course of action will lead to the lesser deprivation of those
rights." 63 In this case, the free speech right to have prayer
must be weighed against the possible Establishment Clause
infringements. 64 The court held that the school board's
right to ban prayers and the Establishment Clause's impact
on all the graduating seniors who would be forced to listen
to prayers outweighed the free speech rights of the four
plaintiffs to hear the prayer. A lesser deprivation of rights
resulted in banning graduation prayers in this case. 65

C.

Summary of Lee v. Weisman

The split in the lower courts and the mixed applications
of the Lemon test prompted the Supreme Court to grant
certiorari to Lee u. Weisman. Many thought that this case
would rid the courts of the Lemon test and clarify the law
for graduation prayer cases.

1. The facts of Weisman
A middle school principal in Providence asked a local
rabbi to give the invocation and benediction at graduation. 66 Principals in Providence, Rhode Island were permitted to invite clergymen to offer invocations and benedictions
at middle and high school graduation ceremonies. 67 Invited
clergy were given pamphlets, which contained guidelines for
public prayers at civic occasions. 68 During the ceremony,
the students sat together, apart from their families. 69 The
students stood for the Pledge of Allegiance and remained
standing during the Rabbi's prayer. 70 In each instance, the

63 ld. at 347 (quoting Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 741 F.2d 538,
539 (3d Cir. 1984)).
64 !d.
65 ld. Under this analysis, the court may have come out the other way if
the students had voted for invocations and benedictions, since their cumulative
rights may have outweighed infringements to the plaintiffs.
66 ld.
67 Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2652-54 (1992).
68 ld.
69 ld.
70 ld.; cf. Harris v. Joint Sch. Dist. No. 241, 821 F. Supp. 638 (D. Idaho
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prayer was less than a minute in length and attendance at
the ceremonies was voluntary. 71
Daniel Weisman, a student's father, brought suit in his
capacity as a taxpayer and on behalf of his daughter to
prohibit graduation prayers. 72 In a close decision, the Supreme Court held in a five-four decision that the prayers
violated the Establishment Clause.

2. Analysis of the Court's holdings
Weisman promulgated a new Establishment Clause test
and eliminated several graduation prayer arguments. The
Court rejected the voluntary attendance, de minimis infringement, and free speech arguments and introduced the
coercion test.
Under Weisman, the coercion test has three parts: (1)
the government directs (2) a formal religious exercise (3) in
such a way as to obligate the objectors either directly or
indirectly to participate. 73 The Court reasoned that the
principal, a state official, directed the exercise, since he
selected who would give the prayer. 74 The principal also
directed the prayer's content by giving the Rabbi guidelines
for his prayer. 75 The Court's opinion that prayer is a religious exercise is more conclusory than analytical, and stems
from the premise that prayers are inherently religious. 76
Students' coerced participation was comprised of being forced

1993) (noting that students did not stand and that they were not forced to participate in any way).
71 Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at 2652-54.
72 ld.
73 ld. at 2655; see also Westside Community Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens, 496
U.S. 226, 261 (1990) (Kennedy, J., concurring); Jones v. Clear Creek Indep. Sch.
Dist, 930 F.2d 416 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. granted, 112 S. Ct. 3020, reh'g denied, 977
F.2d 963, 970 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2950 (1993).
74 Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at 2655.
75 Id. at 2656.
76 ld. Other courts have analyzed the secular and religious purposes of
prayer. See Lundberg v. West Monona Community Sch. Dist., 731 F. Supp. 331
(N.D. Iowa 1989); Graham v. Central Community Sch. Dist. of Decatur, 608 F.
Supp. 531 (S.D. Iowa 1985). Common sense tells us that normally prayer is a
religious exercise. However, the Court provides no basis, even if it is common
sense, for determining how they arrived at this conclusion.
This approach does prevent those advocating prayer from trying to create fictions for justification. It is ironic that under the Lemon test, those seeking invocations and benedictions at special ceremonies must prove that prayer is secular. See
infra note 144 and accompanying discussion on duality.
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to stand during the prayer or at least remain respectfully
silent. 77
It is worthy to note that this coercion analysis only
applied to the students and not to the adults present. 78
The Court does not answer the question of whether the
rights of "mature adults" would be violated in the same
circumstances. 79
Given the opportunity to ban all graduation prayers, the
Court declines. Instead, the Court reiterates the fact-sensitivity of Establishment Clause issues. 80 The Court further
stated, ''We do not hold that every state action implicating
religion is invalid if one or a few citizens find it offensive."81 With this open door and factual-sensitivity in mind,
it is important to review what arguments Weisman eliminated since those not eliminated may still be valid.
First, the Court rejected the voluntary attendance argument, since "graduation is one of life's most significant occasions."82 The importance of the event is the source of the
indirect coercion. 83 Individuals who normally would not
participate in the formal religious exercise of prayer are
forced to participate or forego attending their own graduation.84
Second, the Court refuses to accept that the embarrassment and intrusion caused by prayers is de minimis in
character. 85 The Court rejected this argument by holding
that time cannot measure the intrusion upon one's fundamental rights. 86
Third, Weisman is factually distinguishable from the
history and tradition test in Marsh. The Court reasoned
that

77 Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at 2658.
78 !d. at 2658-59.
79 !d.
80 !d. at 2661.
81 !d.
82 !d. at 2659.
83 !d.
84 !d.
85 See Grossberg v. Deusebio, 380 F. Supp 285, 291 (E.D. Va. 1974). But see
Graham v. Central Community Sch. Dist. of Decatur, 608 F. Supp. 531, 533 (S.D.
Iowa 1985) (rejecting the Grossberg analysis in favor of Graham's analysis).
86 Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at 2659.
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[t)he considerations we have raised in objection to the
invocation and benediction are in many respects similar to
the arguments we considered in Marsh. But there are also
obvious differences. The atmosphere at the op;ming of a
session of a state legislature where adults are free to enter and leave with little comment and for any number of
reasons cannot compare with the constraining potential of
the one school event most important for the student to
attend. The influence and force of a formal exercise in a
school graduation are far greater than the prayer exercise
we condoned in Marsh. 87

Finally, the school argued that prayer is protected under
the First Amendment as free speech. "[O]ur constitutional
vision of a free society requires confidence in our own ability to accept or reject ideas of which we do not appnve, and
that prayer at a high school graduation does nothing more
than offer a choice."88 According to the Court, this argument overlooks fundamental constitutional dynamics. 89 Free
speech envisions full expression even when the government
participates. 90 However, the government should not be a
prime participant in religious debate and expression. 91 In
fact, the Establishment Clause was created to prevent such
interaction. 92 There is no equivalent counterpart in free
speech. 93 The Establishment Clause concern is that what
might begin as tolerance of religious views may end in indoctrination and coercion policies. 94

3. Issues left uncertain
The Weisman opinion narrowly focused on the specific
facts of the case. Many questions were not answered. For
example, what if the students, rather than the school dis-

87 ld. at 2660.
88 ld. at 2657 (recognizing that, by graduation, high school seniors have
been exposed to distasteful or immoral ideas).
89 ld.
90 ld. Sometimes the very objective of free speech is to persuade the government to adopt an idea or course of action. Thus, free speech exchange with the
government as a participator is essential.
91 ld.
92 ld.
93 ld.
94 ld. at 2658 (further stating that "a state-created orthodoxy puts at grave
risk that freedom of belief and conscience which are the sole assurance that religious faith is real, not imposed").
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trict, chose to have a graduation prayer? 95 How much infringement on individual rights is caused by the school
district paying for the facilities where graduation is held
and where invocations and benedictions are given? Does a
parent's presence at graduation have any mitigating impact?
Should the Lemon test apply and how much weight should
courts give to it in the future? 96

Ill. BACKGROUND OF HARRIS V. SCHOOL DISTRICT No. 241

Harris v. School District No. 241 was litigated before
Lee v. Weisman. 97 Although the plaintiffs' and intervenors'
motions for summary judgment were fully briefed and argued, the court deferred judgment pending the outcome of
Weisman. 98 After Weisman the plaintiffs filed to reopen the
proceedings and conduct further discovery. 99
A. Facts of Harris
The senior class of Grangerville High School voted by
written ballot to have an invocation and benediction given
by a student at their graduation. 100 The school district's

95 See Albright, 765 F. Supp. at 684. Weisman's ambiguity leaves one to
wonder about many things.
96 All five federal cases prior to Weisman applied the Lemon test. Three
cases passed the test while two failed. However, there are factual differences between the cases. In both Albright and Jones, students both decided to have prayer
and offered the prayer; whereas, in Lundberg and Graham, the school district
decided whether or not to have the prayers.
97 Harris v. Joint Sch. Dist. No. 241, 821 F. Supp. 638 (D. Idaho 1993).
98 !d.
99 !d.
100 Defendant's Statement of Facts 2 (Apr. 23, 1993). The senior class makes
decisions regarding their graduation program at class meetings. Such decisions are
made with or without administrators being present. For example, the principal
Judy Leuck did not attend the first meeting at which the students passed out
ballots for voting. However, she did attend the second meeting, but did not handle
any of the business at the meeting. !d. Ballots regarding the prayer issue were,
however, prepared by the principal and, following the vote, were collected and
stored by the school administration. Plaintiffs Reply Mem. and Statement of Uncontested Facts Supp. Summ. J. and Injunctive Relief, at 10 (Apr. 30, 1993) [hereinafter Reply].
Students make decisions by voting and "students tally any ballots passed out
regarding high school graduation." !d. For example, senior class members decide
which board members or other persons will present diplomas. Although every element of the high school graduation is not "voted on," students can choose to
change any element of the traditional graduation program. For example,
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policy is to remain strictly neutral regarding student initiated invocations and benedictions at graduation
ceremonies. 101 The principal did not pre-approve graduation
speeches or prayers. However, she did encourage those
speaking and praying to write down their thoughts in order
to polish their presentation. 102 The student giving the
prayers did not give the principal a copy of his text. 103 In
fact, when giving the prayer, he did not use a text. 104 At
the graduation, no one was asked to participate in the
prayers by standing, bowing heads, or removing hats. 105
Plaintiffs, a mother suing on behalf of herself as a
taxpayer and her three children who attended school in the
district, sought injunctive and declaratory relief. 106 A group
of Grangerville students successfully intervened. These students moved for summary judgment on the grounds that the
school district was neutral, and the students' decision to
have prayers did not amount to state intervention. 107

the students could decide that no music be played, that the national
anthem not be played, that there not be a printed program, that there
not be a speaker, or the students could decide to completely change the
sequence of graduation and who presents diplomas. The fact that the
students may not in a given year vote on each and every procedure does
not in any way affect the senior class students' opportunity to decide
these issues.
ld. at 10.
101 Defendant's Statement of Facts, at 4. This policy has not changed in the
last 15 years. The superintendent sent a memo to all district principals in November of 1990 to reinforce the policy of neutrality. This memo did not change the
way graduation was handled at Grangerville High School. The only procedure that
changed in 1991 was that votes were on written ballots. Previously, they were
made by straw polls, hand polls, or some other kind of polling of the senior class.
This procedural change was made due to concern over possible lawsuits.
102 ld. at 5. But see Reply, at 6 (noting that "Principal Leuck admitted suggesting sensitivity and asking Heath to write his prayers down prior to graduation . . . . Class president Mike Emerson's recollection is that Leuck wanted to
review the prayers prior to graduation and Leuck testified that she 'decided not to
make an issue of it.'").
103 ld. Not writing down the prayer and not giving the principal a copy of
the prayer did not prevent Mr. Heath from giving the invocation or benediction.
104 Defendant's Supplemental Bd. Opp'n Summ. J., at 14 (Apr. 23, 1993).
105 Defendant's Statement of Facts, at 5.
106 Complaint, at 2 (Apr. 11, 1991).
107 Intervenors' Supplemental Ba. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. (Apr. 8, 1993); see
also Harris v. Joint Sch. Dist. No. 241, 821 F. Supp. 638, 638-40 (D. Idaho 1993).
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The Court's Analysis in Harris

By focusing on the fact-sensitivity of the Establishment
Clause issues, Harris upheld graduation prayers under the
Lemon test. 108 The court was hard pressed to find state
involvement since the school's involvement did not even
begin to approach the level of Weisman. 109 Since the students were free to decide whether to have prayers, the mere
presence of faculty and administrators did not constitute
state involvement. 110 This logic helped to dismiss entanglement problems under Lemon. The court was also reluctant
to invalidate graduation prayer in light of the decision upholding such prayers in Jones II and the Supreme Court's
hesitation to ban graduation prayers outright in
Weisman. 111 Besides these arguments, little else is used to
support the court's opinion. The court also refers to issues
of whether schools endorsed the prayer, but this concern is
not sufficiently developed to effectively discuss here. 112
IV.

COMMENTARY ON HARRIS

This Nate assumes the accuracy of the following four
premises. First, two distinct tests have come out of the
Court's ruling in Weisman: the Lemon test and the coercion
test. 113 However, Weisman emphasized that each Establish108 The court never specifically mentions Lemon or the endorsement test in
its conclusion, but the language used is similar to such tests used in Defendants'
brief and Jones.
109 Harris, 821 F. Supp. at 643.
110 ld. at 643 (quoting Bd. of Education v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990)).
But see Grossberg v. Deusebio, 380 F. Supp 285 (E.D. Va. 1974).
111 Harris, 821 F. Supp. at 643.
112 The endorsement test has never been accepted by a majority of the Court.
Justice O'Connor first introduced an endorsement test in Lynch v. Donnelly, 465
U.S. 668, 688-89 (1983) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (upholding a city's practice of
owning and displaying a nativity scene during the Christmas season). In Weisman,
the majority took no opinion on the endorsement test, but the four dissenters
found no endorsement on the facts of the case. See Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct.
2649, 2683-84 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Jones v. Clear Creek Indep.
Sch. Dist, 930 F.2d 416 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. granted, 112 S. Ct. 3020, reh'g denied, 977 F.2d 963 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2950 (1993). Although
the Harris case mentions endorsement, it is unclear whether it is attempting to
apply this test. See Harris, 821 F. Supp. at 643. However, if it is applying endorsement, it is probably following the Jones 11 analysis since this test was proposed by the defendant. See Defendant's Supplemental Ba. Opp'n Summ. J., at 1416 (Apr. 23, 1993).
113 Apparently the application of Marsh to graduation prayer did not survive
Weisman. Although Scalia did not want it so, the majority factually distinguished
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ment Clause case is fact-sensitive. 114 Thus, neither test is
controlling, though coercion has current favor. Second, assertion of the arguments specifically rejected in Weisman will
prove dispositive against the party making the assertion.
Third, only three graduation prayer cases have been decided
since Weisman. 115 In addition, Jones II and Harris are sufficiently similar in their facts to justify comparison. 116
Jones II is also the only post-Weisman appellant decision.
Fourth, the endorsement test has not been accepted by a
majority of the Court, so no analysis will be necessary
here. 117
A.

The Coercion Test

As previously stated, the coercion test in Weisman requires three prongs to establish coercion: (1) the government
directs (2) a formal religious exercise (3) in such a way as
to obligate the objector to participate. 118

Marsh.
114 Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at 2261.
115 See Jones v. Clear Creek Indep. Sch. Dist, 930 F.2d 416 (5th Cir. 1991),
cert. granted, 112 S. Ct. 3020, reh'g denied, 977 F.2d 963 (5th Cir. 1992), cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 2950 (1993); Harris v. Joint Sch. Dist. No. 241, 821 F. Supp.
638 (D. Idaho 1993); Griffith v. Teran, 807 F. Supp. 107, 108 (1991) (omitting
Weisman mort). Teran omits the Weisman analysis, perhaps because Teran commenced first-Teran was, however, stayed pending the outcome of Weisman. Subsequent to the Court's decision in Weisman, the parties to Teran agreed that the
practices in question violated the Establishment Clause. Thus, there was no subsequent analysis to help us in our study.
116 In Jones II, the students, not the school district, chose to have prayer at
graduation. A student, not a member of the clergy, was to give the prayer. These
same two facts were present in Harris. There is one major factual difference between these two cases. The prayers in Jones II were reviewed by the district to
ensure that they were nonsectarian. Conversely, in Harris, the school district remained neutral by not monitoring prayer content. While non-monitoring as in Harris increases a school district's neutrality, it also increases the risk of the resulting
prayer being sectarian or proselytizing.
117 See supra note 113 and accompanying text. The endorsement test is very
similar to the primary effects prong of Lemon. Although there are differences, an
endorsement analysis under Harris would be redundant and not terribly meaningful.
118 Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2656 (1992); see also Westside Community Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 261 (1990) (Kennedy, J., concurring);
Jones v. Clear Creek Indep. Sch. Dist, 930 F.2d 416 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. granted,
112 S. Ct. 3020, reh'g denied, 977 F.2d 963, 966-68 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied,
113 S. Ct. 2950 (1993).
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1. Did the government direct the graduation prayer?
In Weisman, the principal directed the graduation
prayer. He decided to have a prayer, selected the Rabbi to
give the prayer, and regulated the contents of the
prayer. 119 In Harris, plaintiffs argued that the school district and principal directed the prayer. The principal asked
the student offering the prayer to put his prayers in writing
and counseled him to be "sensitive."120 The principal also
prepared and stored the voting ballots used by the seniors.121 Finally, the graduation program, which included
references to the invocation and benediction, were printed in
the newspaper at the principal's direction. 122
However, the facts in Harris are distinguishable from
those in Weisman. In Weisman the principal directed the
graduation prayers. Whereas in Harris, the principal's involvement is clearly incidental. She had no control over the
contents of the invocation and benediction. Even if she tried
to exercise some degree of influence by telling the student
to write down his thoughts, following her advice was not a
condition to his giving the prayer. In fact, he ignored her
advice and gave the prayers the way he wanted. 123
Although the principal prepared the ballots, she did not
make the decision. The senior class voted by ballot and
counted the votes. The decision of whether or not there
would be invocations and benedictions at graduation rested
in the hands of the senior class. They could have decided
not to have the prayers as prior and subsequent classes
did. 124
Absolute separation is impossible. 125 Some relationship
between government and religion is inevitable. The issue is

119 Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at 2652-54.
120 Plaintiffs Supplemental Mem. Supp. Injunction and Summ. J., at 3 (Apr.
9, 1993).
121 Reply, at 10.
122 !d.
123 Defendant's Supplemental Ba. Opp'n Summ. J., at 14 (Apr. 23, 1993).
124 The senior class voted to have school prayer at 1991 graduation. In 1990,
they chose to have a musical number as a benediction rather than a prayer. The
Class of 1993 voted to have a moment of silence.
125 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971) (declaring that "[o]ur prior
holdings do not call for total separation between church and state; total separation
is not possible in an absolute sense . . . . [s]ome relationship between government
and religious organizations is inevitable"); see also Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306,
312 (1952).
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whether the government has crossed the line from tolerance
of religious activity to directing the religious exercise. In
Harris, the school district had its agent, the principal, take
a strictly neutral position. They did not make any decisions
regarding the contents of the invocations or benedictions.
The school encouraged voting by secret ballot to reduce the
peer pressure associated with hand polls. If the vote had
been by hand poll, without the presence of the principal,
the minority would have been subject to a greater coercive
force. Claims that preparing the ballots represent direction
or endorsement by the school is attenuated at best. Encouraging such a process shows sensitivity to the issue.
Once the students decided to have a graduation prayer,
the district took a second step to ensure its neutrality.
Since the students voted, the students had actual knowledge
that they, not the district, decided to have the invocation
and benediction. However, the district put a disclaimer in
the program, which was published in the local newspaper,
to cure any public misperception of official endorsement. 126

2. Are invocations and benedictions formal religious
exercises?
Jones II is the only case on record that purports to
analyze the question of whether offering an invocation or
benediction is a formal religious exercise, but the attempt is
rather superfluous. 127 The court never defines "formal religious exercise." It simply reiterates the logic of the government-directs prong, and holds that the district's policy only
tolerates and does not direct prayers. 128The school district

126 Harris v. Joint Sch. Dist. No. 241, 821 F.Supp. 638, 642 (D. Idaho 1993).
The disclaimer states that:
[t]he Board of Trustees of Joint School District No. 241 neither promotes
nor endorses any statements made by any person involved in the graduation ceremony. The District endorses each person's free exercise of speech
and religion and any comments or statements made during the graduation ceremony should not be considered the opinions or beliefs of the
District, the Board of Trustees or the Superintendent.

Id.
127 Jones v. Clear Creek lndep. Sch. Dist, 930 F.2d 416 (5th Cir. 1991), cert.
granted, 112 S. Ct. 3020, reh'g denied, 977 F.2d 963, 971 (5th Cir. 1992), cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 2950 (1993).
128 Jones, at 963 ("Lee directed Rabbi Gutterman to pray, and the Court
Characterized this as a 'formal religious observance' . . . . By contrast, the Resolution tolerates nonsectarian, mit prayer, but does not require or favor it.").
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in Harris followed this same reasoning by claiming that
they simply tolerated and did not direct the prayer. 129
However, unlike Jones II, the district court recognized the
ambiguity of this prong. They raised concerns over how far
the court would go in determining what is a formal religious exercise.
Plaintiffs claimed that Harris is clearly distinguishable
from Jones II due to the religious content of the prayer. 130
Although prayers are normally considered religious, 131 this
does not answer the question of whether such prayers constitute a "formal religious exercise." Arguably, this case is
distinguishable from Weisman since a student, not an ordained member of the clergy, gave the invocation. However,
this distinction poses several new questions unanswered by
Weisman. Do student prayers count as a "formal religious
exercise?" Would student invocations count if they were
nonsectarian and non-proselyting? 132 There is no case law
to support an argument either way.
Theoretically, Establishment Clause cases could stand or
fall on whether certain activities constitute "formal religious
exercises." However, analyzing whether prayer constitutes a
"formal religious exercise" creates such a quagmire that
courts will probably focus on the other two coercion
prongs. 133

3. Are objectors obligated to participate?
Harris implicitly argues that the students' age and the
government's noninvolvement mitigate the coercive effect of
the prayers. This approach is similar to Jones II. 134 The

129 Defendant's Supplemental Ba. Opp'n Summ. J., at 17 (Apr. 23, 1993)
("The School District in this case allows for prayer but wes not require or favor it
given the record before this court which allows for non-prayer alternatives." (emphasis added)).
130 Reply, at 4 ("In Jones v. Clear Creek, a student led invocation was allowed, but the invocation was not a prayer and was nonsectarian and nonproselytizing.").
131 See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
132 Plaintiffs seem to imply that such prayers would count. See Reply, at 4.
133 See. e.g., Jones v. Clear Creek lndep. Sch. Dist, 930 F.2d 416 (5th Cir.
1991), cert. granted, 112 S. Ct. 3020, reh'g denied, 977 F.2d 963, 971 (5th Cir.
1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2950 (1993); see generally Harris v. Joint Sch. Dist.
No. 241, 821 F. Supp. 638, 640-42 (D. Idaho 1993).
134 See Jones II, 977 F.2d at 971. The court uses two arguments to mitigate
the coercive effects of the prayers. First, less psychological pressure was placed on
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Harris argument is supported by Westside Community Board
of Education v. Mergens, which stated that
there is a crucial difference between government speech
endorsing religion, which the Establishment Clause forbids,
and private speech endorsing religion, which Free Speech
and Free Exercise Clauses protect. We think that secondary school students are mature enough and are likely to
understand that a school does not endorse or support
students' speech that it merely permits on a nondiscriminatory basis. 135

This does not directly address the obligation to participate prong. In fact, this approach makes the participation
prong dependant upon the government-directs prong. If the
school directs the prayer, then the students' participation is
essentially obligated. This argument is better placed with
the government-directs prong and should be kept separate
from the participation prong. The voluntary attendance argument would directly address the participation prong, but it
did not survive Weisman. 136
The argument that the students' age and maturity reduces coercion more directly addresses the participation
prong. However, this argument has two major defects. First,
age and maturity only move a case from sure failure to an
area of uncertainty. Second, the Weisman Court specifically
considered the age of students in determining the degree of
coercion. 137 The court specifically separated secondary stu-

the students because "after having participated in the decision of whether prayers
will be given, [all students] are aware that any prayer represents the will of their
peers, who are less able to coerce participation than an authority figure from the
state or clergy." Id. (emphasis added). This argument will probably fail under the
Supreme Court's reasoning since the Court claims "adolescents are often susceptible
to pressure from their peers towards conformity and that the influence is strongest
in matters of social convention." Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2659 (1992)
(emphasis added).
Second, the court considers the students' age is relevant as to whether the
prayer will have a coercive effect. Graduating seniors are "less impressionable than
younger students." Jones II, 977 F.2d at 971.
Although there is validity to these arguments, Jones II focuses on the
government's coercive involvement rather than on whether individuals are obligated
to participate.
135 Harris, 821 F. Supp. at 643 (quoting Westside Community Bd. of Educ. v.
Mergens 496 U.S. 226, 250 (1990)).
136 Neither Harris nor Jones II argued voluntary attendance.
137 Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at 2658-59, in which Justice Kennedy's majority
opinion stated that:
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dents as being more susceptible to pressure to participate. 138 Whether this means graduating seniors, most of
whom are legally adults, are susceptible to pressure to participate is not certain since Weisman involved a middle
school, not a high school. 139
Although not used in either the Jones II or Harris
courts, a stronger argument is that students were not obligated to participate in the prayer. "No one in attendance
at graduation at Grangerville High School in 1991 was
asked to participate in the invocation [or the] benediction by
standing, bowing their heads or removing their hats." 140 If
individuals did not actually participate, how can they claim
coercion for something they did not do? Arguably, others
around them may have bowed their heads, took off their
hats, or folded their arms, which may have created an embarrassing environment when they did not act likewise. But
does this constitute participation, if they did not follow the
lead of those around them? The threshold is unclear. 141
The participation prong seems to rest on the pressure to
participate rather than on any actual participation.
B.

Lemon Applied to Harris

Every graduation prayer case, except Weisman, used the
Lemon test somewhere in its analysis. Although the test has

Finding no violation under these circumstances would place objectors in
the dilemma of participating, with all that implies, or protesting. We do
not address whether that choice is acceptable if the affected citizens are
mature adults, but we think the State may not, consistent with the Establishment Clause, place primary and secondary school children in this
position.
Weisman focuses on whether the students were coerced to participate, not on
whether the adults were coerced. This implies that the coercion standard for the
adults may be different.
138 Id. But see Westside Community Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226,
250 (1990)) (holding that secondary students are mature enough to understand that
the school does not support or endorse other students' religious speech, but merely
permits it).
139 For example, the age deadline to start school in Idaho requires the child
to be five years old by late August. This means that only the students whose
birthdays fall in June, July, and early August will not be 18 by the time they
graduate.
140 Defendant's Statement of Facts, at 5 (Apr. 23 1993).
141 In Weisman, standing during prayer and remaining respectfully silent
were considered to be coercive. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at 2658. It is unclear whether
remaining respectfully silent, by itself, constitutes participation.
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been criticized as unworkable and impracticable, an analysis
of the graduation prayer issue would not be complete without it. To satisfy the Lemon test, graduation prayer must
satisfy three prongs. The government practice must: (1)
reflect a secular purpose; (2) have the primary effect of
neither advancing nor inhibiting religion; and (3) avoid excessive governmental entanglement with religion. 142
Most courts skim over the secular purpose prong very
quickly. The issue is always the same and very simple.
Does the activity have a secular purpose? Prayer serves the
secular purpose of solemnizing a meeting or event. However
prayer also has a religious purpose. 143 Practically speaking,
resolving this prong depends on how the court decides the
primary effects prong. No graduation prayer case has failed
the secular purpose prong after satisfying the primary effects prong. 144 Conversely, no case failing the primary effects prong has ever satisfied the secular purpose prong.
This primary effects test prohibits the school district's
policy, not the graduation prayers, from advancing or inhibiting religion. 145 For many courts this is the focus of their
analysis. 146 In Harris, the school district's policy of remaining strictly neutral on graduation prayers passes the primary effects test. 147 The strongest argument against neutral
142 Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at 2654.
143 No court in analyzing this prong has considered the dual nature of
prayer. In various religions throughout the world, prayer means a variety of
things. Prayer can serve both secular and religious purposes. For one person,
prayer can solemnize the beginning of an important meeting; whereas, for another
person, the same prayer will offer religious meaning.
Christmas celebrations illustrate this duality. A, B, and C tell their boss, "I am
going home to celebrate Christmas." For A this means presents, candy, and Santa
Claus (a clause not found in the First Amendment). For B Christmas means reading the story of Jesus and emulating him by sharing gifts with family, friends, and
neighbors. For C Christmas means all of the above.
Classifying invocations and benedictions as being purely secular or religious is
overly simplistic. The words can mean different things to different people in the
same audience.
144 See, e.g., Lundberg v. West Monona Community Sch. Dist., 731 F. Supp.
331, 342-345 (N.D. Iowa 1989); Graham v. Central Community Sch. Dist. of
Decatur, 608 F. Supp. 531, 535-536 (S.D. Iowa 1985).
145 Both Lundberg and Graham tend to focus on the religious nature of
prayers, rather than if the school district sponsored or endorsed the prayers. See
Lundberg, 731 F. Supp. at 343-44; Graham, 608 F. Supp. at 536.
146 See, e.g., Lundberg, 731 F. Supp. at 343-45; Graham, 608 F. Supp. at
536.
147 See Jones v. Clear Creek Indep. Sch. Dist, 930 F.2d 416 (5th Cir. 1991),
cert. granted, 112 S. Ct. 3020, reh'g denied, 977 F.2d 963, 964 n.1 (5th Cir. 1992),

514

BYU JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW

[Volume 8

policy is that allowing prayers creates ostensible official endorsement problems. 148 The Harris facts mitigate ostensible
endorsement with actual and constructive notice of no endorsement. First, since the students voted, they had actual
knowledge of who decided to have the prayers. 149 Second,
the district gave constructive notice through a disclaimer on
the program, which was previously printed in the newspaper. 150 Such notice should clear up public and student
misperceptions about the district's policies towards graduation prayers.
The excessive entanglement prong does not add much to
the analysis above. 151 The rabbi who wrote and delivered
the prayers at the direction of the principal made this
prong relevant to Weisman. However, in Harris the district's
neutrality policy and having prayers given by students frees
the district from all involvement with religious institutions.152
V.

CONCLUSION

The Court in Weisman could have banned all prayers at
high school graduations. However, it chose not to do so.

cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2950 (1993) (holding that the school district's policy of
leaving graduation prayers to the students' discretion did not have the effect of
endorsing or inhibiting religion). But see Lundberg, 721 F. Supp. at 335 (plaintiff
suing to compel school board to include prayers at graduation); Graham, 608 F.
Supp. at 533 (indicating that school board's decision to have prayers at commencement had the effect of advancing religion). Note that prayers were upheld where
the board was neutral, but not where the board was active. Since the school district in Harris was neutral, it would likely pass the primary effects test.
148 The litmus test for the primary effects prong is whether the activity
"could be seen as lending the imprimatur of government to a particular view of
religion." For example, printing a "motorist prayer" on an official state map violated the primary effects test under this litmus test. Graham, 608 F. Supp. at 536.
149 Remember that the Court is concerned about the students, not the adults,
being coerced by the school district. Lee v. Weisman, 112 S.Ct. 2649, 2658-59
(1992).
150 Harris, 821 F. Supp. at 2658-59. Constructive notice is supported by
Westside Community Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 270 (1990) (Marshall
& Brennan, JJ., concurring in the judgment).
151 Plaintiffs in Graham and Lundberg never argued excessive entanglement.
Accordingly, the courts never analyzed the issue; cf Rex E. Lee, The Religion
Clauses: Problems and Prospects, 1986 B.Y.U. L. REV. 337, 340-42 (1986) (arguing
for the :removal of the excessive entanglement prong).
152 Cf Jones v. Clear Creek Indep. Sch. Dist, 930 F.2d 416 (5th Cir. 1991),
cert. granted, 112 S. Ct. 3020, reh'g denied, 977 F.2d 963, 968 (5th Cir. 1992), cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 2950 (1993).
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Instead it preferred to reiterate the importance of line drawing. Harris clearly is distinguishable from Weisman. The
more important question is whether those distinctions allow
Harris to be on the safe side of the Supreme Court's line.
Harris does not use any of the pre-Weisman arguments
that were struck down by the Court. Harris passes the coercion and the Lemon tests promulgated by the Supreme
Court. The key reasons it passed are the complete neutrality of the school district and the students' freedom to choose.
Jones II, the only other case on record comparable to Harris, supports this analysis and conclusion. Harris is a landmark case illustrating that graduation prayers are alive and
well so long as graduating seniors have a real choice in deciding whether to include prayers and who should give
them.

Robert Phillips

